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Abstract 
This study aims to analyse the Indonesian Supreme Court (Mahkamah Agung) decisions 
to the defendants of substance misuse. The data were based on the Supreme Court decisions for 
substance misuse cases from 2001-2009, uploaded in putusan.mahkamahagung.or.id. The 
database consists of 191 cases involving 218 defendants. Logistic regression and Tobin’s logistic 
regression (Tobit) were used in this study to estimate the probability and the intensity of various 
disposals. This is inline with Becker (1968) argument that the optimal deterrence effect of a 
disposal arose from the probability of conviction and the intensity of punishment.    
The types of punishment sentenced to defendants of substance misuse cases are vary, 
ranging from imprisonment, fines, community service, probation and even a capital punishment. 
The results from logistic regression analyses showed the social costs of substance misuse was 
used by the Supreme Court judges to consider the value of fines sentenced to offenders. the 
social cost that is inflicted by the defendant was only weighed in giving fines to the defendant. 
On the other hand, the results from Tobit regressions showed that the Supreme Court judges did 
not taken into consideration the social cost of substance misuse in determining the intensity of 
punishment sentenced to defendants.   
The explicit social cost caused by the defendants of the narcotics/psychotropic’s case was 
Rp 23.7 billion (about US$ 2.37 million), however the fines charged by the Supreme Court was 
only Rp 5.5 billion (about US$ 550,000). Further investigation showed that the defendants who 
were sentenced to pay fines by the District Courts has 51.7% more probability to be sentenced 
with imprisonment by the Supreme Court. On the other hand, results from Tobit regressions 
showed that the longer the imprisonment sentenced by the District Court, the more fines were 
sentenced to the defendants by the Supreme Court.  
 
Keywords:  Narcotics, Psychotropic, Social Cost of Crime, Financial Punishment, Deterrence 
Effect. 
Jel Classification: K40 
                                                
1 We express our deep gratitude for conference participants in Queenstown, New Zealand. Funding of WCRU 
project from the Faculty of Economics and Business, UGM is highly appreciated. All remaining errors in this paper, 
however, are our responsibility. 
2 Contacting email address: Rimawan@gadjahmada.edu; Rimawan@feb.ugm.ac.id. 
 
 2 
1. Introduction 
The emergence of the economic model of crime was initiated from Becker’s work (1968), 
“Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach”. This work implemented the use of 
mathematical approach to the deterrence theory, proposed earlier by Beccaria (1770) and 
Bentham (1789). Assuming that individuals are rational, Becker (1968) argued that individuals’ 
decision whether or not to commit an offence depend on their estimation of the net expected 
benefits of committing an offence. An offence will be committed (not committed) if the expected 
benefits of conducting the activities exceed (less then) their expected costs. This work, then, was 
referred by many authors and extensive and excellent literature reviews in this field were 
conducted by Garoupa (1997), Kaplow and Shavell (2002) and Polinsky and Shavell (2007), 
among others.   
Levitt and Miles (2007) argued that the economic analysis of criminal actions provide 
impetus on the cognitive side of human decision, whereby an action was committed as a result of 
cost-benefit analysis.  This approach, however, has undermined pscychological factor or other 
social factors which may attributable to offending behaviour. Hundreds of studies in the area of 
behavioural economics show how psychological factors and other social factors may influence 
individuals in making their decision (see Allais, 1954, Ellsberg, 1962, Kahneman and Tversky, 
1979, 1984, Tversky and Kahneman, 1991, 1992, Knetsch, 1994, Camerer, 2000, Starmer, 
2008).  
The court plays a crucial role to form an expected costs of individuals in conducting an 
offence, since the court is an institution which has ultimate authority to decide the probability 
and the intensity of punishment to offenders. This study aims to assess the verdicts of the 
Supreme Court of Indonesia in the case of substance misuse during the period of 2001-2009. The 
database comprise of 191 cases with 218 defendants and the Supreme Court decisions have been 
publised in the Supreme Court in its official website: http://putusan.mahkamahagung.go.id. For 
each case, the document contains of the of the Supreme Court, and the decisions of the previous 
courts (i.e. High Courts (province) and District Courts (district or kabupaten) and also the  
official investigation by the Prosecutor.   
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2. Narcotic and Psychotropic 
Narcotic is a substance or medication that can either come from a plant or non-plant, 
synthetic or even semi-synthetic that can cause a downgrade or shifting consciousness, losing 
senses, reducing to eliminating pain, and can also cause addiction. 3  On the other hand, 
psychotropic is a substance or medication, whether natural or synthetic that is not narcotic, that 
has psychoactive effect by certain influence to some central nerve system that can cause such 
alteration to mental and physical activity. 4  
Narcotic and psychotropic are useful in medical industry, for example as anaesthesia, 
analgesic, and psychiatric drugs. Beside its benefit in the medical industry, narcotic and 
psychotropic can lead to a fatal impact to the users. Narcotic and psychotropic can cause user to 
lose control in continuously using those substances or addiction (UNICEF, 2004). Furthermore, 
intravenous drug users are also subject to possibly catching HIV and HCV (Hepatitis C Virus) 
(Volkow, 2009). 
Individuals with substance misuse problem have higher probability to involve in a 
criminal action, particularly theft and burglary to finance their dependency to the substance 
(ONDCP, 2000). A study conducted by ILO (International Labour Organization) in Egypt, 
Mexico, Namibia, Poland and Sri Lanka showed that substance misusers tend to absence from 
work about twice to three times more often compared to other workers (UNODC, 1994). This 
result shows how the substance misuse may have direct impact on the productivity of an 
economy.  The United Nations acknowledges the impact of substance misuse, thus in 1961 and 
1971 the UN formed Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs and Convention on Psychotropic 
Substances. The ultimate purpose of the conventions is to limit the use of narcotic and 
psychotropic to medical purposes and science.  
3. Substance Misuse in Indonesia 
The rising of illegal distribution of narcotic and psychotropic in Indonesia is in alarming 
situation. In 2007, there were 72 ecstasy factories were found throughout the world, of which 16 
of the factories were located in Indonesia (UNODC, 2009). Indonesia was ranked in 8th place in 
the number of psychotropic seizure for amphetamine in 2007 with as much as 1,230 kg or 3% of 
                                                
3 Law of The Republic of Indonesia number 22 of 1997 Concerning Narcotic. 
4 Law of The Republic of Indonesia number 5 of 1997 Concerning Psychotropic. 
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number amphetamine seizures worldwide (see Figure 1). Furthermore, Indonesia was in the 2nd 
place in Asia and in the 15th place worldwide for illegal cannabis seized with the amount of 
31,870 kg of cannabis seized (UNODC, 2009).  Figure	  1.	  Top	  15	  Nations	  by	  Amount	  and	  Percentage	  of	  Amphetamine	  and	  Cannabis	  seized	  (kg)	  in	  2007	  
 
 (a)Amphetamine-group substances are amphetamine, methamphetamine, and related non-specified amphetamines 
(exclude ecstasy-group substances). 
(b) 1 dosage unit is assumed to be equal to 30 mg; 1 litter is assumed to be equal to 1 kg. 
(c) Data refer to England and Wales only. 
(d)Total seizures reported by national as well as state and territory law enforcement agencies, which may result in 
double counting. 
Source: UNODC (2009) 
 
It was estimated that in 2008 about 3.6 million people or 1.99% of Indonesia population 
had involved in substance misuse related activities. This number has increased dramatically from 
2.9 million people back in 2004 (National Narcotic Agency/BNN and Indonesia University, 
2009). During the period of 2001-2008, the trend of narcotic, psychotropic and other addictive 
substances’ misuse in Indonesia tends to increase every year. In 2008, there were 10,006 
narcotic’s cases and this is considered a huge increase from 1,907 cases in 2001. In 2009, the 
number of cases for psychotropic misuse was 9,780, whereas the number was only 1,648 cases in 
2001 (see Figure 2). 
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Figure	  2.	  Number	  of	  Narcotic,	  Psychotropic	  and	  Other	  Addictive	  Substance	  in	  2001-­‐
2008	  
 
Source: National Narcotics Agency (BNN) (2009), estimated 
4. Legislation Concerning Substance Misuse  
 Nowadays, the fundamental commandment that regulates narcotic is Anti Narcotic Act 
2009 (Law No. 35/2009), which amended Anti Narcotic Act 1997 (Law No 22/1997).  The 
legislation, which regulates psychotropic, is the Anti Psychotropic Act 1997 (Law No. 5/1997). 
The data used in this research is in the period of 2001-2009 and the Anti Narcotic Act 2009 has 
not been implemented yet, therefore all cases in this study were sentenced based on the Anti 
Narcotic Act 1997.  
 The Anti Narcotic Act 1997 classified narcotic into three groups and the Anti 
Psychotropic Act 1997 classified psychotropic into four groups. All classification for both 
narcotic and psychotropic are based on the level of danger and its usage in medical industry as in 
Table 1 below:  
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Table 1: The Types of Narcotic and Psychotropic 
Narcotic Groups Example Psychotropic Groups Example 
Group I Narcotic is narcotic 
that can only be used for 
science purposes and not be 
used in therapy, and also has 
high risk of addiction. 
 Papaver Somniferum, 
Opium, Coke (plant and 
leaf), and Red Cocaine, 
Heroine and Morphine, 
Cannabis 
Group	  I:	  Psychotropic	  that	  is	  
only	  used	  for	  science	  but	  not	  
in	  physical	  practices,	  and	  also	  
has	  a	  high	  risk	  to	  catch	  
addiction.	  
MDMA/Ecstasy,   
N-ethyl-MDA, LCD,      
DOM 
Group	  II:	  psychotropic	  that	  is	  
useful	  for	  medicine	  as	  well	  as	  
in	  therapy	  and/or	  science	  
purposes,	  and	  also	  has	  a	  high	  
risk	  to	  catch	  addiction.	  
Amphetamine, 
Methamphetamine, 
Phenethylamine, 
Phencyclidine (PCP) 
Group II Narcotic is narcotic 
aiming for medical needs 
that are used as the last 
method in therapy and/or for 
research development and 
has a high risk of addiction. 
Alphacetylmetadol, 
Benzethydine, 
Betametadol 
Group III: Psychotropic that is 
useful for medicine and often 
used in therapy and/or science 
purposes, and has a medium 
risk to catch addiction. 
Amobarbital, 
Buprenorphine, 
Butalbital, 
Flunitrazepam 
Group III Narcotic is 
narcotic aiming for medical 
needs and often used in 
therapy and/or research 
development and has a 
lower risk of addiction. 
 Acetyl-dihidrocodeina, 
Dextropropoxyphene, 
Dihidrocodeina 
Group IV: Psychotropic that is 
useful for medicine and 
commonly used in therapy 
and/or science purposes, and 
has a low risk to catch 
addiction. 
Diazepam/Valium, 
Nitrazepam, 
Nordazepam, 
Alprazolam,  
Bromazepam/Lexotan, 
Estazolam/Esilgan 
Source: Anti Narcotic Act 1997 & Anti Psychotropic Act 1997.  
The type of punishments which may be sentenced to the offenders of narcotic and 
psychotropic misuse can be seen in Appendix 1 and 2. According to Indonesian Penal Code 
article 10 (KUHP), the types of main punishments are capital punishment, imprisonment, light 
imprisonment and fines. Furthermore, additional punishments include revocation of certain 
privileges and the seizure of certain goods.  
Both Anti Narcotic Act 1997 and Anti Psychotropic Act 1997, in general, classified 
defendants into three categories: seller, user, and distributor. As previously mentioned, this 
research uses information of narcotic and psychotropic case that was published by the Supreme 
Court (MA) in 2001-2009. The drug’s mistreatments that happened during those years are 
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cannabis, heroine, and cocaine misuse. On the other hand, the mistreatments of psychotropic that 
happened during those years are methamphetamine and ecstasy/MDMA (including lexotan 
capsule). Based on the reasoning, the operational definition of narcotic in this research is 
cannabis (including cannabis latex commonly called hash), heroine and cocaine. Then, the 
operational definition of psychotropic in this research is methamphetamine and ecstasy/MDMA 
(including lexotan capsule). 
5. Court Decisions in Substance Misuse Cases  
Under Indonesia criminal justice system, the prosecution of the attorney toward a defendant 
of substance misuse is in the District Court in each district (Kabupaten). Once the District Court 
has given verdict to the defendant, the defendant (prosecutor) may have right to appeal the 
decision to either High Court (the Supreme Court). The High Court is entitled to sustain, to reject 
or to modify the decision made by judges in the District court. After this stage, the defendant still 
has the right to request a further appeal to the Supreme Court.  
The data set of this study was based on information from the Supreme Court decision 
during of substance misuse cases in the period of 2001-2009 published in official website oft he 
Supreme Court: www.putusan.mahkamahagung.go.id.  
The trend of the case’s number and defendants increased from 2001 to 2007 and started 
to decrease since 2008. In 2001, it started with two cases and six defendants and ended with 63 
cases and 72 defendants in 2007. From 2007, the trend tends to decrease and finally reaches the 
number of 15 cases with 17 defendants in 2009 (see Table 2). Table	  2.	  The	  Number	  of	  Appeal	  of	  Substance	  Misuse	  Cases	  in	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  2001-­‐2009	  
Year 
Number of 
Case 
Number of 
Defendants 
2001 2 6 
2002 5 5 
2003 9 10 
2004 17 17 
2005 15 19 
2006 19 20 
2007 63 72 
2008 46 52 
2009 15 17 
Total 191 218 
Source: Indonesia Supreme Court Decisions, 2001-2009, estimated 
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 Subsequently, the total of fines sentenced to 147 defendants by the Supreme Court is only 
Rp 5.5 billion (about US$ 550,000). This figure is 20.87% lower than to the total Rp 6.6 billion 
(about US$ 660,000) fines prosecuted to those 147 defendants. It should be noted that the total of 
fines sentenced by the District Court is the lowest (Rp 4.9 billion or about US$ 490,000). The 
average fines prosecuted was the highest on average, which was Rp 45.3 million (about US$ 
4,500), followed by the Supreme Court which was Rp 37.5 million (about US$ 3,700) and the 
lowest was by the District Court which was only Rp 33.7 million (about US$ 3,300) (See Table 
3). Table	  3.	  Fines	  Sentenced	  to	  the	  Defendants	  of	  Substance	  Misuse	  Cases	  	  In	  the	  Supreme	  Court,	  2001-­‐2009	  
Level 
Number of 
Defendants 
Total Fines 
Sentenced (in 
U.S Dollar) % Average 
Supreme Court 147 550,590 100.00 3,745 
District Court 147 494,710 89.85 3,365 
Attorney Lawsuit 147 665,490 120.87 4,527 
Source: Indonesia Supreme Court Decisions, 2001-2009, estimated 
In term of imprisonment, the average length of imprisonment to 145 defendants 
sentenced by the Supreme Court was 62.48 months. The average length of imprisonment given 
by Supreme Court however was 23 month less than the average length of imprisonment 
prosecuted, which was 85.11 months. The average value of imprisonment sentenced by the 
District Court to those defendants however was the lowest, which was only 61.51 months (see 
Table 4).  
Table	  4.	  Imprisonment	  Sentenced	  to	  the	  Defendants	  of	  Substance	  Misuse	  Cases	  in	  the	  Supreme	  Court,	  2001-­‐2009*	  
Level 
Number of 
Defendants 
Average (by 
Month) 
Supreme Court 145 62,48 
District Court 145 61,51 
Prosecutor Lawsuit 145 85,11 
*Imprisonment does not include life sentence 
Source: Indonesia Supreme Court Decisions, 2001-2009, estimated 
During 2001-2009, whether the lawsuit from the Prosecutor, District Court, or Supreme 
Court, all have given life sentence and capital punishment to the convicts. The life sentence was 
prosecuted to twelve defendants, in which nine of them were Indonesian passport holders, 
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whereas the rest were foreign citizens. The capital punishment was prosecuted to nine 
defendants, of whom only two were Indonesian citizen and the rest were foreign citizens.  Table	  5.	  Life	  Sentence	  and	  Capital	  Punishment	  Sentenced	  to	  the	  Defendants	  of	  Substance	  Misuse	  in	  the	  Supreme	  Court,	  2001-­‐2009	  
Level 
Life Sentence Imprisonment Capital Punishment 
Number of 
Defendants % 
Citizenship Number of 
Defendants % 
Citizenship 
Indonesia Other Indonesia Other 
Attorney Lawsuit 12 5.50 9 3 9 4.13 2 7 
District Court 6 2.75 2 4 4 1.83 1 3 
Supreme Court 5 2.29 5 0 7 3.21 1 6 
Source: Indonesia Supreme Court Decisions, 2001-2009, estimated 
 
In the District Courts level, six defendants were sentenced with life sentence, of whom 
two were Indonesian and four were foreign citizens. In addition, the District Courts sentenced 
capital punishment to four defendants, of whom one was Indonesian and the rest were foreign 
citizens. The Supreme Court sentenced life sentence to 5 defendants who were all Indonesian 
citizens. Furthermore, the Supreme Court sentenced 7 defendants with capital punishment, of 
whom one was Indonesian citizen and the others were foreign passport holders. (See Table 5). 
The majority of defendants were male. Of 218 defendants, 195 were male and 23 were 
female. In term of their role in substance misuse trade and usage, of 218 defendants observed in 
this research there were 56 sellers, 140 users, and 22 distributors (see Table 6). The background 
of occupation of defendants varies. Of 218 defendants, 113 defendants worked in private sector; 
11 worked in the national army/police department & civil servant; 16 were secondary school 
students & college students; 34 worked as farmers and blue-collar workers; 14 worked as 
fishermen, public drivers, public bike drivers & housewives, and 30 defendants were 
unemployed (see Table 6). 
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Table 6:  The Distribution of Offenders of Substance Misuse Cases Appealed to the 
Supreme Court, According to Gender, Status and Occupation, 2001-2009 	   Classification	   Defendants	   Proportion	  (%)	  Gender	   Male	   195	   89.45%	  Female	   23	   10.55%	  Status	   Seller	   56	   25.69%	  Distributor	   22	   10.09%	  User	   140	   64.22%	  Occupation	   Private	  Sector	   113	   51,8%	  Farmer	  and	  Blue-­‐Collar	  workers	   34	   15,6%	  Army/Police	  and	  Civil	  Servant	   11	   5,0%	  Students	  (High	  Schools	  and	  University)	   16	   7,3%	  Unemployed	   30	   13,8%	  Fishermen,	  Public	  Drivers,	  and	  Housewives	   14	   6,4%	  
Source: Indonesia Supreme Court Decisions, 2001-2009, estimated 
 
The defendants of narcotic/psychotropic misuse cases vary by age with the youngest of 
16 years old, the oldest of 61 years old, and the average of all defendants is 30 years old. The 
histogram (Figure 4) shows that the defendants of substance misuse cases in Indonesia mostly 
vary between 20 to 30 years old (see Figure 3).  Figure	  3.	  Distribution	  of	  Age	  of	  the	  Defendants	  of	  Substance	  Misuse	  cases	  in	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  in	  2001-­‐2009	  
 
Source: Indonesia Supreme Court Decisions, 2001-2009, estimated 
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In term of the type of substances, which were brought into lawsuit, a defendant may be 
prosecuted with more than one type of narcotic/psychotropic. The data show that there were 143 
defendants who were charged for cannabis; 41 were charged for psychotropic in the form of 
ecstasy; 41 were charged for psychotropic in the form of methamphetamine; 14 were charged for 
narcotic in the form of heroin, and; 2 defendants were charged for narcotic in the form of cocaine 
(see Table 7). Table	  7.	  Types	  of	  Narcotic/Psychotropic	  Brought	  into	  Lawsuit	  to	  the	  Defendants	  of	  Substance	  Misuse	  Cases	  in	  Supreme	  Court	  in	  2001-­‐2009	  
Types of Narcotic/Psychotropic Brought 
into Lawsuit 
Number of Narcotic and 
Psychotropic Brought into 
Lawsuit 
Cannabis 143 
Ecstasy 41 
Methamphetamine  41 
Heroine 14 
Cocaine 2 
Source: Indonesia Supreme Court Decisions, 2001-2009, estimated 
 
6. Social Cost of Substance Misuse 
According to Collins et al (2000), the social cost of drugs derives from tangible cost and 
intangible cost. Tangible cost according Collins et al (2000) is an expense that if reduced will 
release resources to every aspect of society to be used for other consumption or investment. For 
example, cost reduction for enforcement, justice, and cost reduction for punishing offenders will 
indeed release more resources to government to invest in other areas. In reverse, intangible cost 
when reduced does not release resources for other uses. Even if the reduction were very 
important, it would not give the benefits that can be redistributed to other areas/parties. Example 
of intangible costs are life loss, pain and suffering, therefore, it is very difficult to weigh the 
value of intangible cost. 
Furthermore, Collins et al (2000), mentions that the production and consumption of 
illegal drugs utilizes certain resources that can be used for alternative consumption and 
production purposes. Of course, if the resources used for other goods and services that are legal 
in law, the government should get tax disbursement from the products along with the customs fee 
(if imported). Based on that reasoning, not only the lost value of the substance’s evidence that 
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was seized from defendants but also the loss of the tax and customs fee (if drugs were smuggled) 
will be involved in social cost calculation from drug’s misuse in this research. Figure 5 shows 
what Collins et al (2000) says about the social cost caused by drug’s misuse.  Figure	  4.	  Social	  Cost	  (External)	  Caused	  by	  Drug’s	  Misuse	  
 
Source: Collins et al (2000) 
As one can see in Figure 5, there is so much of the social cost caused by the drug’s 
misuse. However, because of the limited data to evaluate all tangible cost and the uncertainty to 
value all intangible cost, the social cost in this research can only be estimated by the value of the 
substance’s evidence from the defendants, tax and customs fee that should have been collected if 
all transactions were legally conducted. It is obvious that the estimation of social costs in this 
research is much lower than the real value of the social costs.  
Fees given to narcotic and psychotropic transaction in Indonesia (if legally conducted) 
are similar to other medical substances: 10% from the cost of goods sold plus the customs fee (if 
narcotic/psychotropic is to be imported). The rate of the customs fee and value added tax for 
imported narcotic and psychotropic is based on   Indonesian Customs Tariff Book (BTBMI) 
issued by Indonesian Directorate General of Customs & Excise. Indonesian Customs Tariff Book 
to this issue nowadays is Indonesian Customs Tariff Book 2007 and was Indonesian Customs 
Tariff Book 2004 previously. Since the data used comes from the year of 2001-2009, this 
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research must apply to the Indonesian Customs Tariff Book according to its year appropriately. 
According to the data used in this research, there is no case of smuggled narcotic and 
psychotropic from out of the country during the year of 2001-2003. As a result, the Indonesian 
Customs Tariff Book needed is just the one that applies to year 2004-2009.  
The customs fee to narcotic and psychotropic for Indonesian Customs Tariff Book 2004 
and Indonesian Customs Tariff Book 2009 has the same rate so it would not need a different 
table to compare them. Table 8 shows the customs fee and Value Added Tax to Narcotic and 
Psychotropic in Indonesian Customs Tariff Book 2004 and Indonesian Customs Tariff Book 
2007.  Table	  8.	  Import	  Customs	  Fee	  and	  Indonesian	  Value	  Added	  Tax	  to	  Narcotic	  and	  Psychotropic	  According	  to	  Indonesian	  Customs	  Tariff	  Book	  2004	  and	  2007	  
Form of Narcotic/Psychotropic Customs Fee (%) Value Added Tax (%) 
Cannabis 5 10 
Heroine 5 10 
Methamphetamine  0 10 
Ecstasy5 5 10 
Cocaine 5 10 
Source: Directorate General of Customs & Excise (2010) 
As previously explained, calculation of social cost to narcotic and psychotropic case in 
this research can be shown in the equation below: 
Social Cost =  Price of Narcotic and Psychotropic * Total of the Evidence of Narcotic 
and Psychotropic (in grams and number of pills) + (Total of the Evidence of Narcotic and 
Psychotropic * Price of Narcotic and Psychotropic * Value Added Tax + (Total of the Evidence 
of Narcotic and Psychotropic * Price of Narcotic and Psychotropic * Customs Fee)  
Where: 
• Social Cost: the monetary value of narcotic and psychotropic evidence from defendants 
along with the country’s financial loss (value added tax rate and customs fee) caused by 
illegal transaction of narcotic and psychotropic. 
• Total of Narcotic and Psychotropic Evidence (in grams and number of pills): total of 
evidence seized divided by the number of defendants involved in the case whether it is in 
the same or separate lawsuit. If there is an offender still on the Police Wanted List (DPO), 
                                                
5 There is no customs fee for ecstasy in Indonesian Customs Tariff Book (BTBMI), however according to WHO 
(2010) ecstasy is a descent of amphetamine or amphetamine-type stimulant, thus the customs fee for ecstasy in 
this research uses customs fee of amphetamine. 
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the person cannot be included in the equation because of the pending charges of being 
guilty and whether the person is exist or not (e.g. the defendant suffers schizophrenia, 
etc.).  
• The Price of Narcotic and Psychotropic: the price of narcotic and psychotropic known 
from the investigation. If there is no information from the investigation report, the price 
will follow the average price of narcotic and psychotropic according to National Narcotic 
Agency and Centre of Health Research-UI (2009) and World Drug Report (2009) 
assuming that the exchange rate is Rp 10,000/US$. 
• Value Added Tax: the amount of 10% of narcotic/psychotropic price. 
• Customs Fee: entry fee charges to narcotic and psychotropic if found to be smuggled. 
This fee will follow Indonesian Customs Tariff Book rate. 
As discussed previously, when the price of the evidence from defendant is unknown, the 
estimated social cost of narcotic and psychotropic will follow the national average price of 
narcotic and psychotropic. There are two versions of cost estimation: National Narcotic Agency 
& Centre of Health Research-UI (2009) and World Drug Report 2009, UNODC (2009). Both 
versions use different measurement of estimation. National Narcotic Agency and CHR-UI (2009) 
use the standard of narcotic and psychotropic per package, while UNODC (2009) uses the 
standard of narcotic and psychotropic per gram. For psychotropic in the form of ecstasy, 
National Narcotic Agency & CHR-UI (2009) and UNODC (2009) use the same standard of 
measurement which was per pill.  
In calculating the estimated social cost in the data, if the evidence only has information 
per package and no information whatsoever in grams, the calculation will use the average value 
from National Narcotic Agency and CHR-UI (2009). When there is more detail information of 
the narcotic and psychotropic in grams, the calculation will use the average price of narcotic and 
psychotropic from UNODC (2009). Table 9 shows the average price of narcotic and 
psychotropic nationally by National Narcotic Agency (BNN) & CHR-UI (2009) and UNODC 
(2009). Table	  9.	  The	  Average	  Market	  Price	  of	  Narcotic	  and	  Psychotropic	  in	  Indonesia	  	  
Type of Narcotic BNN & CHR UI 2009 World Drug Report 2009 
Unit Price (US$) Unit Price (US$) 
Cannabis 1 Package 1,5 Gram 0,2 
Cocaine 1 Package 20 Gram 111,7 
Methamphetamine 1 Package 20 Gram 93,6 
Ecstasy 1 Package 14 Pill 9,9 
Heroine 1 Package 10 Gram 93,6 
Source: National Narcotic Agency (BNN) and CHR-UI (2009), World Drug Report (2009) 
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The social cost of substance misuse during the period of 2001-2009 was Rp 23.7 billion 
(about US$ 2.37 million). The social cost of cannabis’ misuse was Rp 5.96 billion (about US$ 
596,000); heroine was Rp 1.01 billion (about US$ 101,000); ecstasy Rp 9.79 billion (about US$ 
979,000); methamphetamine was Rp 6.35 billion (about US$ 635,000); and cocaine was Rp 624 
million (about US$ 62,400). 
The social cost of substance misuse of ecstasy was the highest, followed by that of 
methamphetamine. Even though the number of the defendants prosecuted for ecstasy and 
methamphetamine were not on top of the list, the defendants tend to generate large number of 
ecstasy and methamphetamine in their operation in a short period of time, causing the most 
expensive social costs of substance misuse. On average, within 52 hours, a maker may produce 
up to 25 kilograms of ecstasy or methamphetamine. In the third position, cannabis misuse 
created substantial social cost of substance misuse. This finding may not be surprising since 
cannabis misuse was the highest cases among all other types of substance misuse (see Table 10).  Table	  10.	  The	  Explicit	  Cost	  of	  Substance	  Misuse	  Cases	  Appealed	  to	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  in	  2001-­‐2009	  (current	  price)	  
Type of  Social Cost (US$) % Average  
Cannabis Rp5.96 billion ($596,250) 25,1 Rp41.69 million ($4,169) 
Heroine Rp1.01 billion ($101,331) 4,3 Rp72.37 million ($7,237) 
Ecstasy Rp9.79 billion ($979,061) 41,2 Rp238.79 million ($23,879) 
Methamphetamine Rp6.45 billion ($634,551) 26,7 Rp154.76 million ($15,476) 
Cocaine Rp623.9 million ($62,391) 2,6 Rp511.95 million ($31,195) 
Total 
Rp23.74 billion 
$2,373,584 100   
Source: Indonesia Supreme Court Decisions, 2001-2009, estimated 
 
The social cost inflicted by the defendants of substance misuse cases has not yet been 
able to be covered by financial punishment prosecuted by the attorney or the court of justice. 
Table 11 shows the comparison of the total social cost and the total financial punishment (i.e. 
fines plus total cash evidence) that were brought into lawsuit by Prosecutor or sentenced by 
District Court and the Supreme Court to 200 defendants of substance misuse cases in which the 
estimation of social costs inflicted were known. It is estimated that only 32.7% of the total social 
costs inflicted by the defendants were covered by financial punishment prosecuted by 
Prosecutors. The total of the financial punishment sentenced by the District Courts covered only 
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29.1% of all social cost caused by the defendants. Furthermore, the financial punishment 
sentenced by the Supreme Court covered only 23.2% of all social cost inflicted by defendants.  Table	  11.	  Social	  Cost	  and	  Financial	  Punishment	  Sentenced	  by	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  to	  Defendants	  of	  Narcotic	  and	  Psychotropic	  Case	  in	  2001-­‐2009	  
  
Number of 
Defendants 
Total  
(in Dollar) % 
Average  
(in Dollar) 
Total of Social Cost 200 2,373,584 100 11,867 
Total Financial Punishment brought into 
lawsuit by Prosecutor 200 777,312 32,7 3,886 
Total Financial Punishment by District 
Court 200 689,829 29,1 3,449 
Total Financial Punishment by the 
Supreme Court 200 550,919 23,2 2,754 
Source: Verdict of Supreme Court (2001-2009), estimated 
 
7. Assessment of the Supreme Court Decisions Any	   attempt	   to	   increase	   either	   the	   probability	   of	   conviction	   or	   the	   severity	   of	  punishment	   or	   both,	   ceteris	   paribus,	   are	   going	   to	   increase	   the	   expected	   losses	   from	  committing	   illegal	   activities.	   It	   should	   be	   noted,	   however,	   that	   increasing	   either	   the	  probability	  of	  conviction	  or	  the	  intensity	  of	  punishment	  are	  costly.	  As	  the	  government	  have	  a	  limited	  budget	  to	  spend	  for	  tackling	  crimes,	  then	  the	  optimum	  level	  of	  deterrence	  should	  be	  estimated.	  Consequently,	  the	  authority	  has	  two	  options,	  firstly	  by	  setting	  low	  probability	  of	   conviction	   with	   high	   intensity	   of	   punishment.	   Secondly,	   the	   authority	   setting	   high	  probability	  of	  conviction	  with	  low	  intensity	  of	  punishment.	  	  In	  this	  study,	  given	  the	  defendants	  were	  found	  guitly,	  the	  probabilities	  of	  receiving	  a	  particular	   type	   of	   punishment	   have	   been	   estimated	   using	   Logistic	   regression.	   Logistic	  regression	   is	   part	   of	   limited	   dependent	   variable	   analysis,	   whereby	   the	   values	   of	   the	  dependent	  variable	  are	  binary	  (e.g.	  1	  or	  0,	  yes	  or	  no,	  male	  or	  female,	  etc)	  as	  a	  function	  of	  a	  stream	   of	   explanatory	   variables.	   The	   result	   obtained	   from	   Logistic	   regression	   provides	  information	  on	   the	  direction	   and	   the	   level	   of	   significant	   of	   each	   explanatory	   variables	   in	  affecting	   the	   likelihood	   even	   in	   the	   dependent	   variable.	   Thus	   far,	   the	   coefficients	   in	   the	  Logistic	   regression	   do	   not	   mean	   anything	   apart	   from	   providing	   information	   on	   the	  direction	   and	   the	   significant	   of	   the	   variables.	   The	   contribution	   of	   each	   explanatory	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variables	  to	  influenced	  the	  dependent	  variable	  will	  be	  obtained	  if	  we	  estimate	  the	  marginal	  effect	  of	  the	  Logistic	  regressions.	  	  The	  intensity	  of	  each	  punishment	  would	  be	  estimated	  by	  the	  use	  of	  Tobin’s	  Logistic	  (TOBIT)	   regression.	   The	   TOBIT	   analysis	   has	   been	   used	   since	   the	   value	   of	   dependent	  variable	  is	  bounded	  below,	  namely	  the	  data	  cannot	  be	  negative.	  As	  the	  minimum	  value	  of	  any	   type	   of	   punishment	   is	   zero,	   the	   parameter	   estimate	  would	   be	   biased	   if	  we	   use	   least	  square	  method.	  In	  order	  to	  overcome	  the	  problem,	  the	  TOBIT	  regression,	  which	  is	  part	  of	  maximum	  likelihood	  method,	  has	  been	  used	  to	  estimate	  the	  impact	  of	  various	  criminogenic	  factors	  to	  the	  intensity	  of	  various	  punishment.	  	  
7.1.	  Imprisonment	  
Logistic and Tobit regression models sentencing imprisonment by the Supreme Court to 
defendants who involved in substance misuse cases were given in equations below: !"#$%"$&'()*%"+,-)'-&./!= ! + !!ln   _!"#$%&'"()! + !!!_!"#$%&'(")(*+,! + !!!_!"#$%&'!+ !!!_!"#$%! + !!!_!"##"$! + !!!_!"#$! + !!!_!"#$!"#$%&!+ !!!_!"#$%#&!"#$_!"##$%! + !!!_!"#$"%! + !!"ln   _!"#! !"#$%&'(")(*+,!= ! + !!!"#$%&'"()! + !!!"#$%&'(")(*+,! + !!!"#$%&'! + !!!"#ℎ!"#$%!+ !!!_!""#$%&'!"! + !!!_!"##"$! + !!!_!"#$! + !!!_!"#$%&'(#)!+ !!!_!"#$%#&!"#$_!"##$%! + !!"!_!"#$"%! + !!!!"#!   
 
Where: 
• BivariateImprisonmentSCi : The verdict of Supreme Court to drop imprisonment to 
defendants, 1= given imprisonment, 0= not given imprisonment  
• D_FinesDCi: Dummy variable for fines penalty by District Court to defendant, 1= given 
fines, 0=not given fines 
• D_ImprisonmentDCi: Dummy variable for imprisonment by District Court to defendant, 1= 
given imprisonment, 0=not given imprisonment  
• D_EviDCi: Dummy variable for the evidence’s seizure (evidence in cash and unmoving 
object) by the officials of District Court to defendants, 1= given search warrant to seize 
evidence to be state property, 0=not given search warrant to seize evidence to be state 
property 
• ImprisonmentSCi : Variable of the length of imprisonment charged by Supreme Court to 
defendant (in Month) 
• SocialCosti: Variable of how big of social cost caused by defendant of narcotic/psychotropic 
misuse (in Rupiah) 
• FinesDCi: Variable of how much the fines penalty given by District Court to defendant (in 
Rupiah) 
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• ImprisonmentDCi: Variable of the length of imprisonment charged by District Court to 
defendant (in Month) 
• CashEviDCi: Variable of how much the evidence seizure in cash by District Court to 
defendant (in Rupiah) 
• D_GoodsEviDCi: Dummy variable for the evidence’s seizure in unmoving object by the 
officials of District Court to defendants, 1= given search warrant to seize evidence to be state 
property, 0=not given search warrant to seize evidence to be state property 
• Agei: Age of defendant when prosecuted for narcotic and psychotropic by Prosecutor 
 
The use of independent variable in the equation above is based on the assumption that 
there are few conditions that Judge should consider before giving a sentence to defendant, which 
are (a) social cost inflicted by the defendant, in which in the action found the value of narcotic 
and psychotropic taken from the offender and the financial loss that the country has to suffer; (b) 
imprisonment penalized by the previous court, which is District Court. The verdict of the High 
Courts was not taken into account since in many cases Prosecutors who made appeal from the 
District Court straight to the Supreme Court;  (c) the equality before the law principal that should 
be obeyed in giving charges, in order to discover that this research uses variables of occupation 
status, age, and gender of defendants, and; (d) cost and benefit from the combination of 
sentencing options. 
The sentencing options that are applied broadly nowadays in every nation are 
imprisonment, fines, and the seizure of evidence6. Bowles and Florackis (2007) reported that for 
the case in England and Wales, offenders who were previously punished with imprisonment had  
a smaller probability to repeat the offence in comparison to other offenders who were sentenced 
with other types of punishment. The study shows that imprisonment has a better deterrence effect 
in comparison to the other disposals. It should be noted, however, that imprisonment tend to be 
costly (Polinsky and Shavell, 1984; Bowles and Pradiptyo, 2005). Indeed, fines tend to be more 
economical in term the cost to impose the sentencing option, however, Polinsky and Shavell 
(2005) argued that the deterrence effect from fines itself is not optimal if the gain of the crime 
action is bigger than his/her wealth so that it will need extra penalty in the form of imprisonment 
in order to optimize the deterrence effect of punishment. 
 
                                                
6  According to Indonesian Penal Code article 10 (KUHP) written by Moeljanto (2003), there are two kinds of penal 
laws: main penalty and additional penalty. Main penal law consists of capital punishment, imprisonment, light 
imprisonment and fines punishment. Additional punishment consists of revocation of certain rights, seizure of 
possession, and the announcement of Judge’s verdict. 
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Table 12: Logistic and Tobit Regressions of Imprisonment 
Dependent Variables: D_ImprisonmentSC Dependent Variables: ImprisonmentSC 
1 = The Supreme Court Gives the Imprisonment to 
Defendant Length of Imprisonment Given by 
Supreme Court to Defendant 
0 = Otherwise 
Independent 
Variables 
Coeffi
cient Prob. 
Marginal 
Effect 
Independent 
Variables 
Coeffic
ient Prob. 
Constant -1.232 0.73 - Constant 19.297 0.071 
ln_SocialCost -0.056 0.559 -0.003 SocialCost 0.000 0.134 
D_ImprisonmentDC 0.702 0.227 0.048 ImprisonmentDC*** 0.938 0 
D_FinesDC*** 3.904 0 0.517 FinesDC 0.000 0.752 
D_EviDC -1.428 0.14 -0.139 CashEviDC 0.000 0.522 
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   D_GoodsEviDC -16.178 0.105 
D_Seller -0.806 0.497 -0.055 D_Seller* 13.211 0.063 
D_User -0.103 0.924 -0.006 D_User -4.358 0.485 
D_Unemployed -0.500 0.544 -0.033 D_Unemployed -6.438 0.278 
D_Farmer&Blue-
Collar 0.300 0.724 0.015 
D_Farmers&Blue-
Collar -1.162 0.842 
D_Gender 0.310 0.702 0.019 D_Gender -10.208 0.105 
ln_Age 0.401 0.692 0.023 Age -0.244 0.321 
Total Observation = 189     Total Observation = 190   
Prob.                        = 0.0000   Prob.                        =  0.0000   
Pseudo R2               = 0.4023     Pseudo R2               = 0.1598   
 
The logistic regression analysis in Table 12 shows that the social cost inflicted by 
defendants does not become a significant factor for Judges in the Supreme Court in sentencing 
defendants with imprisonment. The interesting point that can be taken is that in giving the 
imprisonment, the Supreme Court does not consider if the District Court gives imprisonment or 
not. Nevertheless the Supreme Court considers the fines given by the District Court before 
sentencing the imprisonment (significance level 1%), whereas, if defendants is charged with 
fines by the District Court, seen from the value of marginal effect, the defendant has 51.7% 
higher probability to be given imprisonment by the Supreme Court compared to other 
defendants.  
The result shows that the Supreme Court tends to consider the high cost of imprisonment, 
leading to another consideration whether there should or should not be fines given by the District 
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Court to cover the high cost of imprisonment. This result has its reason considering the total and 
probability of defendant to suffer fines by the Supreme Court is influenced by the District 
Court’s verdict in giving fines to defendant that can be seen to the analysis in the fines penalty by 
Supreme Court in the next section.  
Pradiptyo (2009), in his research about the verdict of Supreme Court in Indonesia in 
handling the corruption cases finds that defendant who has occupation as Civil Servant has 
smaller probability to receive imprisonment by the Supreme Court compared to other defendants. 
In contrast, the result of logistic regression in this research does not show any violation of 
equality before the law by the Supreme Court in giving imprisonment as discovered in 
Pradiptyo’s (2009) study.  
Although the probability of defendant to suffer the imprisonment by Supreme Court is 
not influenced by the condition whether there is a imprisonment given by District Court or not, 
the result of Tobit regression analysis shows that the length of the imprisonment given by 
Supreme Court to defendant is influenced by the length of the imprisonment given by District 
Court (significance level 1%). The positive value of variable’s coefficient shows that the longer 
of the imprisonment given by District Court, the longer of the imprisonment will be given by 
Supreme Court to defendant. Furthermore, the length of imprisonment given by Supreme Court 
is not influenced by the amount of fines given by District Court.  
Table 12 shows that defendants who acted as seller tend to receive longer imprisonment 
as oppose to the other defendants. This finding is inline with Law of Narcotic and Psychotropic 
and the concept of fairness explained previously, where the penalty given to defendant who 
produce, supply, and sell narcotic and psychotropic is generally higher than the user or 
distributor. It should be noted that the finding is significant only at level of 10%.  
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7.3. Fines   
7.3.1. Logistic Regression Analysis of Fines Penalty by Supreme Court  
Logistic regression model used to discover significant variables that influences the 
verdict of Supreme Court in giving fines to defendant is as followed: 
 !"#$%"$&'(")'*+,!= ! + !!ln   _!"#$%&'"()! + !!!_!"#$%&'! + !!!_!"#$%&'(")(*+,!+ !!!_!"#$%! + !!!_!"##"$! + !!!_!"#$! + !!!_!"#$%&'(#)!+ !!!_!"#$%#&!"#$_!"##$%! + !!!_!"#$"%! + !!"ln   _!"#! 
 !"#$%&'! = ! + !!!"#$%&'"()! + !!!"!"#$%! + !!!"#$%&'(")(*+,! + !!!"#ℎ!"#$%!+ !!!_!""#$%&'()! + !!!_!"##"$! + !!!_!"#$! + !!!_!"#$%&'(#)!+ !!!_!"#$%#&!"#$_!"##$%! + !!"!_!"#$"%! + !!!!"#! 
 
Where: 
• FinesSC : Variable of the fines penalty that is charged by Supreme Court to defendant (in 
Rupiah). 
• BivariateFinesSCi : Verdict of Supreme Court to drop fines penalty to defendant, 1= given 
fines, 0= not given fines 
 
The assumption in the equation above is the same with the equation of logistic regression 
for the imprisonment in previous section, where the Supreme Court is assumed to consider the 
social cost inflicted by defendant, equality before the law principal, cost and benefit from the 
combination of penalty, and the status of defendant as user or seller in giving the fines penalty to 
defendant.  
Table 13 shows the estimation of the logistic regression model of fines. The value 
Prob<0.01 indicates that the model has significant reliability with 189 total observation 
(defendants). Then, the value of Pseudo R2 0.7767 that comes from the estimation result indicates 
that the variance of independent variables in the model can explain 77.67% variance of 
dependent variables. 
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Table	  13.	  Logistic	  and	  Tobit	  Regression	  Analyses	  for	  Fines	  	  
 
Dependent Variables: BivariateFinesSC Dependent Variables : FinesSC 
1 = Supreme Court Charges Defendant with Fines 
Penalty Total Financial Fines Charged by 
Supreme Court to Defendant 
0 = Otherwise 
Independent 
Variables 
Coeffi
cient Prob. 
Marginal 
Effect 
Independent 
Variables 
Coefficie
nt Prob. 
Constant -2.255 0.675 - Constant 5520845 0.674 
ln_SocialCost*** 0.492 0.005 0.037 SocialCost** 0.03 0.44 
D_FinesDC*** 7.060 0.000 0.930 FinesDC*** 0.81 0 
D_ImprisonmentDC -0.540 0.614 -0.035 ImprisonmentDC** 134271.9 0.024 
D_EviDC 0.054 0.978 0.004 CashEviDC 2.629451 0.576 
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   D_GoodsEviDC -5156594 0.666 
D_Seller -1.322 0.505 -0.134 D_Seller -3218299 0.71 
D_User -2.175 0.189 -0.139 D_User -1347296 0.86 
D_Unemployed 0.327 0.804 0.022 D_Unemployed -3775606 0.605 
D_Farmers&Blue-
Collar -0.640 0.589 -0.058 
D_Farmers&Blue-
Collar -8150611 0.271 
D_Gender 1.139 0.347 0.123 D_Gender -3047229 0.695 
ln_Age -1.698 0.287 -0.127 Age -289503.2 0.346 
Total Observation = 189     Total Observation = 190   
Prob.                        =  0.0000    Prob.                        =  0.0000   
Pseudo R2               = 0.7767     Pseudo R2               = 0.0379   
 
The result indicates that defendant charged with fines by the District Court has 93% 
higher probability to suffer fines by Supreme Court compared to other defendants (significance 
level 1%). This result explains that the Supreme Court tend to be in accordance with the verdict 
of District Court in giving the fines penalty to defendant.   
The logistic regression result also shows that the social cost inflicted by defendant is a 
significant variable to Supreme Court to sentence fines, whereby the higher the social cost 
inflicted by defendant, the higher the probability to suffer fines penalty given by Supreme Court 
(significance level 1%). The marginal effect of variable ln_SocialCost is 0.0367 which indicates 
that if the social cost inflicted by defendant is higher than 1 from the average value of 
ln_SocialCost, then the defendant has 3.67% higher probability (compared to other defendants) 
to receive fines by the Supreme Court, and so on, vice versa, ceteris paribus. 
 23 
The result raises the next question: why is the social cost amount still higher than the 
fines penalty given to defendant? This question will be answered from the next Tobit model 
analysis in the next section. The result of Tobit model explains that the social cost inflicted by 
defendant does not influence fines penalty given by the Supreme Court. This certainly answers 
the question why the social cost caused by defendant is bigger than the fines penalty given by the 
Supreme Court.  
The amount of fines penalty given by Supreme Court is actually influenced by the 
amount of fines penalty and imprisonment given by District Court to defendant, whereas the 
higher the fines penalty (significance level 1%) and imprisonment (significance level 5%) given 
by the District Court, the higher the fines penalty given by the Supreme Court. This finding 
shows that the Supreme Court tends to considers the high cost of imprisonment so that the longer 
a person will serve in prison, the higher the fines penalty given to cover the cost of the 
imprisonment. This result has its reason considering the result of Tobit model earlier that 
suggests that the longer the imprisonment given by District Court, the longer the imprisonment 
given by the Supreme Court. This result also supports the result of logistic regression earlier 
which suggests that the Supreme Court tends to be in accordance with the decision of District 
Court in giving fines penalty.  
 
7.4. Seizure of Evidence  
7.4.1. Logistic Regression Analysis of Evidence’s Seizure by the Supreme Court  
Logistic regression model used to discover significant variables that influence the verdict 
of Supreme Court in seizing evidence in the form of goods and cash to defendant is as followed:  
 !"#$%"$&'(#")*!= ! + !!ln   _!"#$%&'"()! + !!!_!"#$%! + !!!_!"#$%&'(")(*+,!+ !!!_!"#$%&'! + !!!_!"##"$! + !!!_!"#$! + !!!_!"#$%&'(#)!+ !!!_!"#$%#&!"#$_!"##$%! + !!!_!"#$"%! + !!"ln   _!"#! 
 !"#ℎ!"#$%! = ! + !!!"#$%&'"()! + !!!"#ℎ!"#$%! + !!!_!"##"$! + !!!_!"#$!+ !!!_!"#$%&'(#)! + !!!_!"#$%#&!"#$_!"##$%! + !!!_!"#$"%! + !!!"#! 
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Where: 
• BivariateEviSCi : The verdict of Supreme Court in seizing evidence (whether in the form of 
cash or unmoving object) to defendant to be state property, 1= seizing evidence to be state 
property, 0 = not seizing evidence to be state property. 
• CashEviSCi: Variable of the warrant amount in the form of cash given by Supreme Court to 
defendant (in Rupiah). 
 
The assumption used in the equation above is the same with the equation of logistic 
regression for imprisonment and fines penalty. Supreme Court is assumed to consider the social 
cost inflicted by defendant, equality before the law principal, cost and benefit of penalty 
combination, and status of defendant as seller or user in seizing evidence in the form of 
goods/cash from defendant. The result of logistic regression in Table 14 shows that the verdict of 
Supreme Court to seize evidence whether cash or goods from defendant is influenced by the 
verdict of District Court in seizing evidence (significance level 1%). If defendant is charged with 
evidence’s seizure by District Court, then the defendant has 21.86% more probability to be 
charged with evidence’s seizure by the Supreme Court compared to other defendants.  
The result of logistic regression in Table 14 also suggests that the social cost inflicted by 
defendant is not a significant factor to Supreme Court in giving the warrant to seize evidence. 
Although it is not stated in the law of narcotic and psychotropic, ideally, the social cost amount 
becomes a consideration to Supreme Court in seizing evidence in the form of cash or goods from 
defendant to cover the state loss that is included in the social cost inflicted by defendant.  
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Table	  14.	  Logistic	  and	  Tobit	  Regression	  Analyses	  for	  the	  Seizure	  of	  	  Evidence	  	  
Dependent Variables: BivariateEviSC Dependent Variables: CashEviSC 
1 = Supreme Court Seize Evidence in the Form of 
Cash & Goods from Defendant to be State Property, 0 
= Otherwise 
The Amount of Cash Evidence Seized by 
Supreme Court from Defendant to be 
State Property 
Independent 
Variables 
Coeffic
ient Prob. 
Marginal 
Effect 
Independent 
Variables Coefficient Prob. 
Constant -0.209 0.96 - Constant -1799711 0.039 
ln_SocialCost 0.070 0.475 0.002 SocialCost 0.000 0.561 
D_EviDC*** 2.382 0.004 0.219 CashEviDC*** 1.157051 0 
D_FinesDC 0.479 0.533 0.015 	  	   	  	   	  	  
D_ImprisonmentDC 0.483 0.568 0.015 	  	   	  	   	  	  
D_Seller* 2.247 0.064 0.138 D_Seller 264239.8 0.597 
D_User -0.128 0.917 -0.004 D_User -241378.3 0.618 
D_Unemployed -1.316 0.289 -0.030 D_Unemployed -206665.8 0.678 
D_Farmer&Blue-
Collar 0.558 0.495 0.023 
D_Farmers&Blue
-Collar 130818.2 0.742 
D_Gender 0.872 0.465 0.022 D_Gender 807944.4 0.199 
ln_Age -1.822 0.144 -0.062 Age -17458.12 0.403 
Total Observation = 201 Total Observation = 202   
Prob.                        =  0.0067 Prob.                        =  0.0000   
Pseudo R2               = 0.2283 Pseudo R2               = 0.1085   
 
 
Pradiptyo (2009) in his research of the Supreme Court’s verdict in penalizing the 
corruptors in Indonesia, finds violation of equality before the law principle in the verdict of 
search warrant to seize evidence by Supreme Court, where male defendant has a higher 
probability to be charged with search warrant to seize evidence by Supreme Court. As opposed 
to the result of logistic regression in this research, defendant’s occupation, gender, or even age of 
defendant of narcotic/psychotropic misuse is not considered by Supreme Court in giving the 
warrant to seize evidence.  
Tobit model used to discover significant variables that influence the amount of cash that 
can be seized by Supreme Court is as followed. In the equation of Tobit analysis above, the 
dependent variable used is the warrant of seizure in the form of cash instead of goods because of 
the uncertainty in converting goods evidence seized into monetary value. The assumption used in 
the equation above surely differs from the previous equation because in this issue Supreme Court 
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is not to decide the value of cash seized from defendant, but the cash evidence seized from 
defendant is determined by some criminogenic factors and status of defendant.  
Assumption used in the equation above is that the amount of cash evidence seized from 
defendant will be influenced by the amount of narcotic/psychotropic seized from the defendant 
and country’s financial loss that is caused by defendant which can be simply stated as social cost. 
Subsequently, the status of defendant as seller and user is assumed to influence the amount of 
cash evidence seized by Supreme Court from defendant. As explained earlier, it is assumed that 
seller receives monetary profit from the action and not so to the user. Thus the amount of cash 
evidence seized from defendant will be influenced by the status of defendant. Meanwhile, the 
status of occupation, age, and gender of defendant are considered as criminogenic factor that can 
influence the amount of cash evidence seized by Supreme Court from defendant. For the 
variables of previous verdict, the assumption used is still the same with the assumption used in 
the previous section which is the Supreme Court has the right to give consent toward the court’s 
decision or to deny it and make an alternative decision.  
The result of Tobit analysis shows that cash evidence seized by District Court becomes a 
consideration to Supreme Court in giving warrant to seize cash evidence from defendant 
(significance level 1%). Variable coefficient that has positive value indicates that the more cash 
evidence seized by District Court, the more Supreme Court will give the warrant to seize 
evidence. This result supports the logistic regression analysis earlier that Supreme Court tends to 
be in accordance with the verdict of District Court in giving warrant to seize evidence in the 
form of cash from defendant. 
8. Concluding Remarks  
In this research, it was discovered that the Supreme Court has not yet considered the 
social cost inflicted by defendant of narcotic and psychotropic cases in making the verdict. The 
result of logistic regression suggests that the higher the social cost inflicted by 
narcotic/psychotropic case defendant, the bigger the probability of defendant to suffer fines 
penalty by the Supreme Court. However, the result of Tobit model shows that the high social 
cost inflicted by defendant does not influence the amount of fines penalty given by Supreme 
Court to defendant. The result of analysis can explain why the financial punishment given by the 
Supreme Court is not sufficient to cover the social cost inflicted by defendant.  
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Financial punishment given by Supreme Court could only cover 23.2% of the social cost 
inflicted by defendant. The social cost of narcotic/psychotropic goes up to Rp 23.7 billion (about 
US$ 2.37 million), and the financial punishment given by Supreme Court is only Rp 5.5 billion 
(about US$ 550,000). The difference of the social cost that could not be covered by the financial 
punishment will eventually leave society and government to suffer.  
Furthermore, the logistic regression and also the tobit model show that the social cost 
inflicted by defendant does not become a consideration to Supreme Court in giving 
imprisonment or warrant to seize evidence. When the social cost does not become a 
consideration in giving imprisonment or warrant to seize evidence, it might cause inequality 
between the intensity of the punishment and the impact inflicted by defendant’s crime action. 
The inequality of punishment intensity and the impact inflicted by defendant can definitely 
weaken the deterrence effect and the expectation of sanction of defendant and all society.  
The next logistic regression analysis shows that defendant charged with fines penalty by 
District Court has 51.7% higher probability to receive imprisonment by the Supreme Court 
compared to other defendants. While, the Tobit model analysis explains that the longer 
imprisonment given by District Court to defendant, the bigger fines penalty will be given by 
Supreme Court to defendant. To consider whether there should or should not be a punishment in 
order to give another punishment has been exercised by Supreme Court and that indicates that 
the Supreme Court has evaluate the cost and benefit of penalty combination.  
Even though there is no violation of equality before the law by Supreme Court in regards 
of occupation status, age, even gender of defendant in this research, Supreme Court should 
reconsider the social cost caused by defendants in making the verdict. Therefore, the amount of 
punishment could match the impact caused by defendant and deterrence effect from the 
punishment will generate a better outcome.  
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Appendices 
 
Appendix	  A:	  
 
Table A.1.: Criminal Offense and Its Sanction Dropped Based on the Law of The Republic of 
Indonesia number 22 of 1997 Concerning Narcotic 
Num. Form of Narcotics Violation Type of Punishment 
1 Growing, keeping, having in quantity, possessing, 
storing or controlling narcotics, whether in plant 
form or non-plant form (article 78 and 79) 
1. Serving in prison between 2 years to 
15 years 
2. Fines between Rp 25 million (US$ 
2,500) to Rp 5 billion (US$ 500,000) 
2 Producing, managing, extracting, converting, 
assembling or providing (article 80) 
1. Capital punishment 
2. Sentence to life 
3. Serving in prison between 4 years to 
20 years 
4. Fines between Rp 200 million (US$ 
20,000) to Rp 7 billion (US$ 700,000) 
3 Carrying, delivering, transporting, distributing 
narcotics without privileges and breaking the law 
(article 81) 
1. Capital punishment 
2. Sentence to life 
3. Serving in prison between 2 years to 
20 years 
4. Fines between Rp 100 million 
(US$10,000) to Rp 5 billion (US$ 
500,000) 
4 Importing, exporting, offering to sell, distributing, 
selling, buying, handing, receiving, being an 
intermediary in buying/selling or trading 
narcotics without privileges and breaking the law 
(article 82) 
1. Capital punishment 
2. Sentence to life 
3. Serving in prison between 4 years to 
20 years 
4. Fines between Rp 200 million (US$ 
20,000)  to Rp 7 billion (US$ 700,000) 
5 Persuading others to use narcotics or handing 
narcotic to others for consumption without 
privileges and breaking the law 
1. Serving in prison between 5 years to 
10 years 
2. Fines between Rp 250 million (US$ 
25,000) to Rp 750 million (US$ 
75,000) 
6 Using narcotics for self consumption without 
privileges and breaking the law 
Serving in prison between 1 year to 4 years 
 
7 Parents or guardians from an underage user who 
intentionally do not report the crime 
1. Imprisonment up to 6 months 
2. Fines for Rp 1 million (US$ 100) 
8 Using underage subjects to execute narcotic’s 
crime 
1. Sentence to life 
2. Serving in prison between 5 years to 
20 years 
3. Fines between Rp 20 million (US$ 
2,000) to Rp 600 million (US$ 60,000) 
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9 An addict in legal age or family (parents) who 
intentionally do not report the crime 
 
1. Serving in prison between 3 months to 
6 months 
2. Fines between Rp 1 million (US$ 100) 
to Rp 2 million (US$ 200) 
10 Medicine manufacture staff who does not do the 
due diligence according article 41 and article 42, 
not labeling the package of narcotics and 
publicizing narcotics outside of medical-science 
and pharmacy printed-media (article 89) 
1. Serving in prison up to 7 years 
2. Fines up to Rp 200 million (US$ 
20,000) 
 
11 Obscuring or complicating investigation, 
prosecution or examination (article 92) 
1. Serving in prison up to 5 years 
2. Fines up to Rp 150 million (US$ 
15,000) 
12 Ship captain and pilot that without privilege do 
not abide by the law in article 24 and article 25, 
not making a report about narcotic carriage to the 
local customs office (article 93) 
1. Serving in prison up to 10 years 
2. Fines up to Rp 150 million (US$ 
15,000) 
 
13 Prosecutor who does not abide by the law in 
article 69 and article 71, does not seal and make a 
report, inform or handing over possession in 
seizure, destruct narcotic plant found on sight 
(article 94) 
1. Serving in prison up to 6 months 
2. Fines up to Rp 1 million (US$ 100) 
 
14 Witness who gives false statement in court 
(article 95) 
1. Serving in prison up to 10 years 
2. Fines up to Rp 300 million (US$ 
30,000) 
 
15 Submit to narcotic crime outside of Indonesia’s 
territory 
Apply to the Law of The Republic of 
Indonesia number 22 of 1997 
 
Source: Hiariej et al (2006) 
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Appendix	  B	  
Table	  B.1:	  	  Criminal	  Offense	  and	  Penalty	  Based	  on	  the	  Law	  of	  The	  Republic	  of	  
Indonesia	  number	  5	  of	  1997	  Concerning	  Psychotropic	  
Num. Form of Psychotropic’s Crime Type of Sanction 
1. Using, producing, distributing, importing, owning, 
keeping, carrying, shipping, exporting, labeling and 
making an advertisement of psychotropic that are in 
opposition with the Amendments (article 59 to 63) 
1. Capital punishment 
2. Life sentence 
3. Serving in prison between 3 bulan to 
20 years 
4. Fines between Rp 60 million (US$ 
6,000) to Rp 5 billion (US$ 500,000) 
2. Complicating an attempt to get a treatment/rehab and 
hold a rehabilitation facility without legal permit 
(article 64)   
1. Serving in prison up to 1 year 
2. Fines up to Rp 20 million (US$ 
2,000) 
3. Fail to report a practice/possession of psychotropic 
illegally (article 65) 
1. Serving in prison up to 1 year 
2. Fines up to Rp 20 million (US$ 
2.000) 
4. Exposing the identity of eyewitness in 
psychotropic’s case (article 66) 
Serving in prison up to 1 year  
 
5. Using an under 18 year old child to commit 
psychotropic’s crime (article 72)  
Penal warning and 1/3 addition of the 
existing penal law 
Source: Hiariej et al (2006) 
 
